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In his target article, "Why fish do not feel pain,” Key (2016) makes quite a number of
conceptual, philosophical, and empirical missteps along the path to his conclusion denying fish
pain. In this brief commentary, I will address only three.
To begin with, Key's central premise — that human neocortical structures are required for pain
— begs the question. Key's basic argument looks like this:
P1. Neural structure N is required for mental/phenomenal state M in humans.
P2. Thus, N is a necessary condition for M (that is, no N entails no M).
P3. Fish lack N.
C. Therefore, fish lack M.
In other words, Key argues that because structure X is required for mental state M in humans, X
is a necessary condition for M in fish. It's the move from (P1) to (P2) that is problematic. (Key
might deny that he is making this move, but I see no other plausible way of reading his
argument.) This move is problematic both empirically and philosophically. Biologically speaking,
convergent evolution may implement similar functions in structures that are not homologous.
For example, while it's true that the bone structure of the wings of bats is required for bats to
fly, it does not follow that organisms lacking such structures, for example, bees, cannot fly.
Philosophically, to say that these human structures are required for pain, again, begs the very
question of whether fish are sentient. For even if those neocortical structures that Key cites are
required for human pain experience, it does not follow that they are required for fish pain
experience. As Colin Allen (2013, p. 36) notes, "[t]he possibility of convergent evolution at the
behavioral and cognitive levels despite morphological and anatomical differences at the
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neurological level makes fish an enormously interesting testing ground for ideas about multiple
realizability of cognition.”
Whereas Key exhorts us to overcome our "anthropomorphic tendencies that bias
interpretations of behavioral observations" and warns against jumping to "unsupported
anthropomorphic conclusions" such as that fish feel pain, his central argument trades on a kind
of "reverse" anthropomorphism wherein pain is a uniquely human (or mammalian)
phenomenon. Key's criticism conflates two distinct and important senses of
“anthropomorphism.” Unnecessary anthropomorphism involves explaining behavior by
attributing (what are believed to be uniquely) human traits and characteristics to beings or
objects whose behavior can be better explained without such an attribution. For example, the
explanation of my computer’s not booting up despite my having pressed the power button is
not that my computer is angry with me, but rather that there is some malfunction with the
powering-up mechanism. By contrast, biocentric anthropomorphism involves the indispensable
use of human terms to explain animals’ phenomenal states (Bekoff 2000). It is in this second
sense, not the first, that we attribute pain states to fish based on reasonable interpretations of
the overwhelming behavioral evidence.
Second, Key grounds his thesis in the "bioengineering principle" that structure determines
function. However, as any philosopher of biology worth her salt will tell you, this kind of
reductive analysis of function is problematic and, at best, naive. Though biologists commonly
correlate structure with function, it is an error to argue (as Key does) that an understanding of
the neuroanatomical structure of an organism reveals that structure's function. For example,
the recent discovery of a heretofore unknown structure of the human cornea (e.g., Dua's layer)
certainly did not ensure the identification of its function through only structural information.
Furthermore, different structures — for example, teeth and gastric acids — often carry out the
same function. Key's argument relies on the mistaken assumption that pain is a functional result
of one set — and only one set — of neuroanatomical structures that humans possess and fish
lack. However, this type of structural-functional determinism overlooks the quite real possibility
that phenomenal states like pain in fish are realizable by multiple different means.
Lastly, with regard to the ethical implications of the controversy over fish pain, Key criticizes
advocates of the precautionary principle with regard to fish welfare. Advocates of the principle
advise that given the lack of scientific consensus on the question of fish sentience, it is more
prudent to assume that fish are indeed sentient and that this assumption should inform fish
welfare policy and practice. Key warns against applying the principle in questions of fish welfare
for fear of "catastrophic effects" including "inappropriate approaches to fish welfare" and
negative economic impacts for the fishing industry. However, as with any decision that uses the
precautionary principle, the proportionality of the risk of harm must be weighed against the cost
and feasibility of a proposed action. In the case of fish, Key's conclusion that we should abandon
the principle is premature. First, according to a study by the U.K. fish welfare organization
Fishcount.org, about 970 to 2,700 billion fishes are caught from the wild annually. If fish are
sentient (and there is good evidence that they are), then the number of sentient beings in the
form of fish that are slaughtered for food annually equals at least twelve times that of the
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current human population (Mood & Brooke 2010). If the idea of such a moral atrocity weren't
enough, current world fishing trends point to a global eradication of all taxa currently fished,
causing a total collapse of the fishing industry by the year 2048 (Worm et al. 2006). Surely, by
any moral calculus, applying the precautionary principle regarding fish welfare is reasonable and
prudential, if not obligatory.
Epistemological worries about the mental states of other-than-human animals present unique
challenges to the certainty of any claims of knowing their phenomenal states. This kind of
epistemological challenge is a species of a more general philosophical worry, namely, the
problem of other minds, which goes something like this: Forget about whether I can ever know
whether a fish feels pain: how can I ever know whether you (or any other human being)
experiences pain? For all I know, you could be a philosophical zombie — a robot exhibiting all
the behaviors consistent with my own pain experience, yet totally devoid of any "what-it’s-like"
experience.
To address the epistemological puzzle, it’s not necessary to solve the mind–body problem or the
problem of other minds. What we need is the ability to aggregate and synthesize our best
physiological and behavioral data on the question of nonhuman animal pain, and from that,
make a reasonable inference regarding the experiences and phenomenal aspects of our fellow
creatures, like fish. Surely, as of the writing of this commentary, the corpus of such evidence
weighs in favor of fish sentience. Yet, Key's oversights lead him too hastily, with ungrounded
certainty and without sufficient warrant, to conclude that fish do not feel pain.
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